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THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. PASQUALE LA MACCHIA
et at, Defendants; RALPH B. FILIOE et aI., Respondents.

':)

[1] Witnesses-Cross-enmination-Scope and Extent.-The field
of inquiry in cross-examination for purpose of testing credibility and weight of testimony is so extensive that trial court
must be given wide discretion to keep such examination within
reasonable bonnds.
[2] Id.-Cross-examination-Scope and Extent.-When appellate
court is called on to decide whether discretionary power of
trial court over cross-examination has been abused, inquiry is
whether a sufficiently wide range has been allowed to t.:-st
credibility and weight of testimony rather than whether some
particular qnestion should have been allowed.
[3] Eminent Domain-Evidence as to Damages-Value of Other
Land.-Witnesses giving their opinions of valne of land being
condemned cannot, on direct examination, testify as to particular transactions, such as sales of adjoining lands, how
mnch has been offered and refused for adjoining land or for
land in question, or how mnch the condemning party has been
oompelled to pay in other and like oases, notwithstanding these
transaction may constitute sonrce of their knowledge.
[4] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Examination of Witnesses.On cross-examination of a witness as to valne of land, evidence of particular transactions, snch as sales of adjoining
lands, is admissible for sole pnrpose of discrediting opinion
of witness, but it may not be considered for purpose of fixing
valne of land in dispute.
[1] See Cal.Jar., Witnesses, § 76; Am.Jar., Witnesses, § 620
et seq.
[3] See CaLJur., Eminent Domain, § 68 et seq.; Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, §§ 347, 351.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Witnesses, § 133; [2] Witnesses,
§l34(1); [3, 8, 17] Eminent Domain, § 81; [4, 16] Evidence,
§ 546; [5, 12] Evidenoe, § 530(3); [6, 1] Evidence, § 452;
[9, 10] Evidence, § 530(1}; [11, 13, 141 Evidence, § 530(2);
[15, 28, 31] Eminent Domain, §lS2; [18, 191 Evidence, § 551:
[20] Witnesses, §l80; [21] Eminent Domain, § 69(9); [22J
Eminent Domain, § 81; [23J Fnninent Domain, § 80; [24J Eminent
Domain, § 88; [251 Eminent Domain, § 188; [261 Eminent Domain.
1181(1) j [21J Eminent Domain, 1163; [29] Evidence, § 563; [30]
Eminent Domain, § 69(3).
.
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[5] Id.-Opinion Evidence-Value of Property.-One who has
given his opinion as to value of certain property may, on
direct examination, state reasons on which it rests, but the
facts stated as reasons do not b.come evidence in sense that
they have independent probative value on issue as to market
value.
[6] Id.-Opinion Evidence-Bases of Opinions.-Evidence of matters incompetent as substantive evidence may not be introduced
for purpose of fortifying opinion of an expert witness,
though offered under guise of reasons for his opinion, and
though they might be admitted on cross-examination to test
and diminish weight to be given his opinion.
[7] ld. - Opinion Evidence - Bases of Opinions.-General rule
which permits witness to state reasons on which his opinion
is premised may not be used as a vehicle to bring before jury
incompetent evidence.
[8] Eminent Domain-Evidence as to Damages-Value ot Other
Land.-On direct examination, a witness should not be allowed
to go into details of particular offers for property being condemned or specific sales or transactions in connection with
other property.
(9] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Value of Property.-All that is
necessary to entitle a witness to give an opinion on subject
of value is to show that he has some peculiar means of forming
an intelligent and correct judgment as to value of property in
question beyond what is presumed to be possessed by men
generally.
[10] Id.-Opinion Evidence-Value of Property.-The usual expert is qualified to give an opinion on value by showing his
familiarity with property in question and with other property
in neighborhood, his experience in the business, his familiarity
with state of market and of sales of similar property in
vicinity.
[11] Id. - Opinion Evidence - Value of Property.-A property
owner is generally considered competent to el!timate value of
his property on a showing that he has resided thereon for a
number of years.
[12] Id.-Opinion Evidence-Value of Property.-Owner of land
is entitled to state on direct examination the reasons for hi.
opinion as to worth of his property, but those reasons can
be no broader than those of any other witness qualified to state
an opinion.
[18] Id.-Opinion Evidence-Value of Property.-Ownership with
residence on land for a reasonable time establishes owner's
[9] See Cal.Jur., Evidence, § 277 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence,
§ 891 et seq.
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qualification to testify as to value of his property, but it does
not extend scope of inquiry on direct examination; evidence
of .an offer to purchase the property is nonetheless collateral
and as productive of delay and confusion when brought bcfore
jury by owner as it would be if presented by an expert on
land values.
U4] ld. - Opinion Evidence - Value of Property.-A property
owner and an expert witness are in a different· position only
insofar as their qualifications to testify rest on different bases,
and in stating his opinion as to value of property the owner
is bound by same rules of admissibility of evidence as is any
other witness.
[16] Eminent Domain-Proceedings-Appeal-Rarmless Error.Error in a condemnation proceeding in admitting evidence
relating to an offer to purchase a portion of property of
owners affected did not prejudice the state, where such offer
constituted a small part of all evidence before jury on value
of such property, and where it does not appear that mention
of offer for only portion of land influenced verdict to any substantial extent.
[16] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Examination of Witnesses.Evidence of an offer to purchase property may properly be
presented on cross-examination for purpose of testing weight
to be accorded an opinion as to value.
U7] Eminent Domain - Evidence as to Damages - Sales.-Although generally a witness testifying as to value of property
being condemned should not be allowed, on his examination
in chief, to go into details of particular sales or transactions,
the core of inadmissibility is the consideration, and where no
price is mentioned the rule of inadmissibility does not apply.
[18] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Examination of Witnesses.The amount paid for other land may not be presented to jury
on redirect examination in a condemnation cnse, where it is
offered as independent proof of value.
[19] ld.-Opinion Evidence-Examination of Witnesses.-FactorB
going to weight to be accorded an expert opinion constitute
"new matter" within meaning of Code Civ. Proc., § 2050, de·
elaring that a witness once examined cannot be reexamined
as to same matter without leave of court, but may be 1'&examined as to any new matter on which he has been examined
by adverse party.
[20] Witnesses-Reexamination.-On redirect examination, it is
proper to permit a witness to state facts and circumstances
tending to correct erroneous inferenees which may have been
drawn from his testimony on cross-examination.
[21] Eminent Domain-Estimation of Damages-Value of PropertJ Talten.-In determining market value of land being con-
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demned, the test is not its value for a special purpose, but
fair market value of land in view of all purposes to which
it is naturally adapted.
[22) Id.-Evidence as to Damages-Value of Land 'luen.-In
ascertaining value of real property being condemned, any evidence which tends to show physical condition of property, the
purpose fot· which it is employed, or any reasonable use for
which it may be adal)ted, is competent.
[is] Id.-Evidence as to Damages.-Evidence as to what owner
intended to do with land being condemned cannot be considered in estimating the damages.
[24] IeL-Evidence as to Damages-Prospective l1ses.-Under certain circumstances evidence that a proposed use of property
being condemned would result in a profit is admissible, not
for purpose of enhancing damages by showing loss to owner
of particular plan of operation, but to show thatsueh proposed
plan is feasible and should be considered in. fixing market
value.
[25} Id.-Proceedings-Appeal-Ha.rm1ess Error.-In a condemnation proceeding, any prejudice resulting from erroneous
admission of evidence concerning owner's purposes with regard to his property was, to a considerable extent, o1fset by
other testimony similar in character which was received without objection.
[S6] Id.-Proceedings-Appeal-Presumptions.-on appeal from
a judgment awarding damages to OWDers of property taken
by eminent domain, it will be presumed that jury understood
instrnctions which clearly and unambiguously Bet forth law
with regard to future nse of property as distinct from its
market value, and correctly applied such instrnCtiODB to the
evidence.
[27] IeL - Proceedings - InstructioDS.-In proceeding for condemnation of land for use as a freeway, instrnctions as a
whole fairly Btated controlling principles concerning existing
right of access to highway, although jurors might have been
told that extent of easement of access may be said to be that
which is l'easonably required giving eons~deration to all purposes to which property is adapted, where they were told that
only when condemnation destroys or subatantially impairs
right of access is an owner entitled to compensation therefor.
[28] Id.-Proceedings-ApPeal-Harmless and Reveralble Error.
-An instrnction in a condemnation proceeding. that "Owners
are presumed to know the value of their property, and being
permitted under the law to testify thereto, their evidence in
that regard is entitled to be weighed and considered by the
jury" was not reversible error, ali~ough word "presumed"
ahould not have been used, where the awarda were far below
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values placed by owners on their respective properties, and
where other instructions stated that final responsibility for
determining amounts to be awarded rested with jurors, and
that it was their duty to evaluate and weigh testimony of
witnesses who stated their opinions as to values.
[29] Evidence-Province to Determine Weight and Oredibility.Upon triers of fact rests responsibility to reconcile, if possible,
any apparent conflict, whether the same arises on entire case
or in testimony of a single witness, and to effectuate all
evidence when nature of case will admit of such disposition.
[SO] Eminent Domair.-Estimation of Damages-ValUe of Property Taken.-Compensation for property taken by eminent
domain is based on loss imposed on owner rather than on
benefit received by taker, and beneficial purpose to be derived
by condemnor's use of property is not to be taken into consideration in determining market values, being wholly irrelevant.
[31] Id.-Proceedings-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error.
-In proceeding for condemnation of land for use as a freeway, an erroneous instruction that, in ascertaining market
value, the purpose for which property was being taken by the
state could be considered was not reversible error, where jury
was also told that although market value of property was
to be determined with due consideration of all available uses,
its special value to the state must be excluded as an element
of market value, where there was no evidence in regard to
value of use to the state for highway purposes, and where
jury received usual instruction to award compensation "in
accordance with the evidence in this case."

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County. Byrl R. Salsman. Judge. Affirmed.
Proceeding for condemnation of land for use as a freeway.
Judgment for defendants affirmed.
Robert E. Reed, Holloway Jones, Jack M. Howard, Roger
Anderson and Edward L. Doyle for Appellant.
J. Oscar Goldstein, P. M.. Barceloux, Burton J. Goldstein,
and Goldstein. Barceloux & Goldstein for Respondents.
EDl\10NDS, J.-For the purpose of constructing a freeway,
the state is condemning certain land bordering the presently
existing highway, which is to be widened. Along each side
of the freeway there will be a fence cutting off access to it
except through 20-foot openings at certain points.

)
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There are five parcels of land involved in the state's
appeal from the judgment awarding damages to the owners.
These parcels have a frontage on the present highway of from
260 to 5,000 feet. On the land having the 5,OOO.foot frontage,
there are to be three 20-foot openingl!l in the fence at con·
venient points. One 20.foot opening is to be provided for
each of the other parcels. The land to be taken for inclusion in the freeway ranges from less than one foot to 60
feet in width. The area of four of the parcels varies from
10 to 38 acres; the largest one has 1,245 acres.
The experts called by the state and those who testified
for the owners placed substantially the same values on the
land taken. However, they varied markedly on severance
damages. That was occasioned principally by a difference
of opinion as to the highest and best use of the land along
the highway, which was being used for agricultural purposes
with the usual improvements relating to farming and fruit
growing. The state's witnesses based their opinion as to
the amount of severance damages primarily upon the loss of
agricultural utility and loss of convenience of agricultural
operations for 20 feet from the freeway fence, with certain
allowances for rearrangements of existing improvements. The
owners and their experts testified that at least a portion of the
land presently is adaptable and suitable for commercial de·
velopment but cannot be used for such purpose with the
restricted access planned by the state.
According to the state, the severance damages are grossly·
excessive, and were allowed because, of errors in evidentiary
rulings and the instructions. The property owners maintain
that the rulings and instructions were correct, and in any
event not prejudicial.
One of the issues is whether the trial court erroneously
and prejudicially curtailed the state's cross-examination of
the property owners' witnesses. [1] "The field of inquiry
in cross·examination for the purpose of testing the credibility
of a witness and the weight of his testimony is so extensive
that the trial court must be given wide discretion in order
to keep such examination within reasonable bounds; other·
wise the trial of cases would be overlong. [I] When an
appellate court is called upon to decide whether such dis·
cretion has been abused, the inquiry is whether a sufficiently
wide range has been allowed to test sUch credibility and
weight rather than whether some particular question should
have been allowed." (EMf Bay it.n. Utilit" Din. T.

",
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Kieffer, 99 Cal.App. 240, 261 [278 P. 476, 279 P. 178].)
The state is complaining of seven rulings in some 240 pages
of the cross-examination of three experts. No useful purpose
would be served by stating the specific questions which, it
is claimed, should have been permitted, for each is peculiar
to the circumstances of this case. The record shows that
the state's objections are not well taken. The trial judge
allowed wide . latitude in the cross-examination of the witnesses, and in bringing certain lines of inqury to a close
there was no abuse of discretion.
The state's second contention is that the trial court erred
in admitting evidence relating to an offer to purchase a portion of the property owned by Ercole and Rafaella Pelliccione.
Upen direct examination Ercole Pelliccione testified that he
valued his property before the taking at $105,000. Asked
the "reason for that opinion," he stated. "The reason is the
frontage-it's almost 700 feet-I had on Monterey Road, that
is all business property. The people, they asked me in 1947,
they wanted to buy it." The state interposed an objection.
upon the grounds of irrelevancy and incompetency, which
the trial court overruled. Pelliccione continued: "In 1947
I was contacted by some people, they wanted to buy one acre
right there where the big oak tree was, to build a motel, and
they offered me $7,000. . . ."
This answer placed before the jury testimony which may
not be elicited upon direct examination. [3] The long
established rule in this state is that witnesses •• cannot, tlPon
the direct examination, be allowed to testify as to particular
transactions, such as sales of adjoining lands, how much has
been offered and refused for adjoining lands of like quality
and location, or for the land in question, or any part thereof,
or how much the . . . [condemning party has] been com·
pelled to pay in other and like cases-notwithstanding these
transactions may constitute the source of their knowledge."
(Central Pac. B. B. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247, 262.) The
courts have neither deviated nor retrea~d from this rule.
(City of Los Angeles v. Hughes, 202 Cal. 781, 786 [262P.
787]; Estate of Boss, 171 Cal. 64, 65-66 {lSI P. 1188];
Atchison, T. ~ 8. P. R; Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal.
App.2d 505, 512 [57 P.2d 575]; H'f,oernia 8a11. etc. Soc. v.
Ellis Estate Co., 132 Cal.App. 408, 411 [22 P.2d 806]; City
of Los Angeles v. Deacon. 119 Ca1.App. 491, 493-494 {7 P.2d
878] ; Merchants' Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 103 Cal.App. 473,
478-479 [284 P. 1072].)

)
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In an early case this court pointed out that to allow evidence of particular transactions to be presented on direct
examination would open up each transaction as a side issue
and the invesitgation would be rendered interminable. (Oentral Pac. R. R. 00. v. Pearson, supra, at p. 262.) [4] Upon
cross-examination, however, such evidence is admissible for
.the sole purpose of discrediting the opinion of the witness
(Oentral Pac. R. R. 00. v. Pearson, supra, at p. 262; Reclamation Dist. No. 790 v. Inglin, 31 Cal.A.pp. 495, 500 [160 P.
1098] ; Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Oorp. v. Etienne, 83Cal.App.
645, 647 [257 P. 123]), but it may not be considered for the
purpose of fixing the value of the land in dispute. (Estate
of Ross, supra, at p. 66; ReeZamati(}n Dist. No. 790 v. IngZin.
S1tpra, at p. 500.)
The owners assert, however, that evidence of an offer to
purchase the property desired by the state may be presented
upon direct examination as a reason for the opinion of the
witness. [6] It is clear that one who has given his opinion
as to the value of certain property may, upon direct examination, state the reasons upon which it rests. (Long Beach Oity
H. S. Dist. v. Stewart, 30 Ca1.2d 763, 773 [185 P.2d 585, 173
A.L.R. 249].) But the· facts stated as reasons do not become
evidence in the sense that they have independent probative
value upon the issue as to market value. (TMrnton v. Birmingham, 250 Ala. 651 [35 So.2d 545]; 32 C.J.S .• Evidence,
§ 521, p. 219.) Instead, they serve only to reinforce the
judgment of the witness, that is, they go to the weight to be
accorded his opinion. (See Long Beach City B. S. Disi. v.
Stewart, supra, at p. 773.) [6] As said in Peirson v. Boston EZ. R. 00., 191 Mass. 223 [77 N.E. 769] : " [T]here is no
right to put in evidence of matters which are incompetent
as substantive evidence for the purpose of fortifying" the
opinion of an expert witness, even though they are offered
under the guise of the reasons for his opinion, and even
though they might properly have been' admitted on cross.examination to test and diminish the weight to be given to
his opinion." (Pp. 233-234.) The rule is similarly expressed in United States v. 25.406 Acres of LaM, 172 F.2d
990, 993, and Nichols states it in substantially the same
language. (5 Nichols on Eminent Domain [3d ed.] § 18.45
[1], p. 181.)
[7] The general rule which permits a witness to state
the reasons upon which his opinion is premised may not be
used as a vehicle to bring before the jury incompetent evi-

/
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dence. To so open up the inquiry would create a disastrous
break in the dike which stands against a flood of interminable
investigation. [8] Upon direct examination, a witness never
should be allowed to go into the details of particular offers
for the property being condemned or specific sales or transactions in connection with other property. (Reclamation
Dist. No. 730 v. Inglin, supra, at p. 500.)
The property owners urge that a distinction must be
made between a witness such as Pelliccione, who is an owner
of one of the properties being taken by the state, and the
witness who testifies as an expert. They argue that the scope
of the direct examination of the expert is more limited
than that of a property owner. However, there is no logical
ground for any such distinction. [9] "All that is necessary
to be shown to entitle a witness to give an opinion is to show
'that he has some peculiar means of forming an intelligent
and correct judgment as to the value of the property in question . . . beyond what is presumed to be possessed by men
generally.''' (Spring Valley W. W. v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal.
528, 534 [28 P. 681].) [10] The usual expert is qualified
by proof of his familiarity with the property and with other
property in the neighborhood, his experience in the business,
his familiarity with the state of the market and of sales of
similar property in the vicinity. (Estate of Ross, supra, at
pp. 66-67.) [11] A property owner, on the other hand, is
generally considered competent to estimate the value of his
property upon a showing that he has resided thereon for a
number of years. (Long Beach City H. S. Dist. v. Stewart,
supra, at p. 772; Spring Valley W. W. v. Drinkhouse, supra,
at p. 534.)
[12] The state did not challenge Pelliccione's competency,
and he was entitled to state upon direct examination the
reasons for his opinion as to the worth of his property.
(Long Beach City H. S. Dist. v. Stewart, supra, at p. 773.)
Those reasons could be no broader than those of any other
witness qualified to stat~ an opinion. [13] Ownership with
residence on the land for a reasonable time established his
qualification to testify, but it did not extend the scope of'
the inquiry upon direct examination. Evidence of an offer
to purchase is nonetheless collateral, and as productive of
delay and confusion, when it is brought before the jury by
the owner as it would be if it were presented by an expert
on land values.
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In Peirson v. Boston El. R. Co., supra, a property owner
had been permitted to relate upon his direct examination
the details of offers to purchase his property. It was held
that the rule permitting a witness to state the reasons under·
lying an opinion did not afford the owner a means for in·
troducing otherwise incompetent evidence on the ultimai!:'
question of value, and that the testimony relating to offers to
purchase was therefore improperly admitted. [14] Clearly.
therefore, a property owner and an expert witness are in a
different position only insofar as their qualifications to testify
rest upon different bases. In stating his opinion as to the
value of property, the owner is bound by the samE rules
of admissibility of evidence as is any other witness.
Long Beach City H. S. Dist. v. Stewart, supra, does not
hold to the contrary. In that ease, an objection was sustained
to a question asking an owner upon what he based his opinion
as to value. "[T] here is not the slightest indication in the
record or in the briefs concerning the nature of the testimony which appellant would have given in reply to the
question" (p. 774). Under such circumstances it was decided that he "should have been permitted to state the reasons
for his opinion on market value."
[15] Although the evidence now challenged was inadmissible, the error did not prejudice the state. The offer to
purchase constituted a small part of all the evidence before
the jury on the value of Pelliccione's property (c/. Railway
Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, at p. 513), and from the
record as a whole it does not appear that mention of the
offer for only a portion of the land influenced the verdict to
any substantial extent. (Cf. Reclamation Dist. No. 730 v.
l'llglin, supra, at pp. 500-501.)
Another asserted violation of the rule prohibiting evidence as to offers to purchase occurred during the crossexamination of the owners' witness Challen. A question of
counsel for the state was, " [8] 0 do I understand that in your
opinion this highway frontage on these parcels would be
around seven, eight thousand dollars an acre if placed upon
the open market for saleY" Challen replied, "I investigated
one parcel here that I had heard an offer had been made on
..• , as a matter of fact, Mr. Pelliccione was offered $7,000
for 200 feet." In denying a motion to strike out the statement upon the ground that it was not responsive, the court
said, "[I]t's explanatory of his answer."
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[16] In its briefs the state challenges this testimony upon
the sole ground that it violates the rule against the admission
of offers to purchase. But the questioning was upon crossexamination, and evidence of an offer may properly be presented at such time for the purpose of testing the weight to
be accorded an opinion as to value. Under the circumstances
shown by the record the trial court properly refused to strike
the testimony. (Cf. Code Civ. Proc., § 2052.)
Upon redirect examination of Challen, he was interrogated
concerning thc offer as to the acreage and contemplated use
of the property. Over objection upon the ground that the
information was· incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial,
Challen stated that it was for an area about 200 by 200 feet
to be used for a service station. That statement added little
to the facts brought out on cross-examination. However,
Challen also said that Pelliccione had been approached in
negotiations for a motel site on the same property. Challen
made no mention of the prices offered, but said that all of
the owners had refused similar offers "even at the prices they
were offered . . . because they wanted that free ingress and
egress that they have had prior to the installation of that
fence."
[17] Although, as a general proposition, a witness upon
his examination in chief should not be allowed to go into
the details of particular sales or transactions (Reclamation
Dist. No. 730 v. biglin, supra, at p. 500), the core of inadmissibility is the consideration. (San Francisco v. Tillman
Estate Co., 205 Cal. 651, 656 [272 P. 585] ; Estate of Ross,
supra, at p. 67.) Where no price is mentioned, the rule laid
down in Central Pac. R. R. Co. v. Pearson, supra, does not
apply. (San Francisco v. Tillman Estate Co., supra, at pp.
656·657.)
Another contention is that evidence of the sales of other
property was erroneously admitted. In cross-examination
of two of the owners' expert witnesses, the state brought
out the prices at which various other properties in the vicinity
had been sold. Those prices were considerably lower than
the values placed by each of the witnesses upon the land
being condemned. Upon redirect examination, and over the
state's objection, the witness was permitted to state the
various facts which, in his opinion, tended to reconcile the
prices paid for other land with the valuation he had given.
Such inquiry, it is urgedJ should not have been allowed.
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[18] The amount paid for other land may not be presented
to the jury upon redirect examination where it is offered as
independent proof of t"alue. (Reclamation Dist. No. 790
v. lngUn, supra, at p. 500.) [19] However, section 2050
of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, in part: "A witness
once examined cannot be re-examined as to the same matter
without leave of the court, but he may be re-examined as
to any new matter upon which he has been examined by the
adverse party. " Certainly, factors going to the weight to be
accorded an expert opinion constitute "new matter" within
the meaning of this statute.. [20] Also, upon general
principles, it is proper to permit a witness to state facts and
circumstances tending to correct erroneous inferences which
may have been drawn from his testimony upon cross-examination. (Pedley v. Doyle, 177 Cal. 284 [170 P. 602] ; Myers
v. Rose, 27 Ca1.App.2d 87, 89 [80 P.2d 527]; People v.
Corey, 8 Ca1.App. 720, 725 [97 P. 907] ; 2 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.] § 463, p. 512.)
With one exception, the many cases cited by the state in
support of its position do not state a contrary rule. Some
of them concerned the propriety of such evidence upon direct
examination (City of Los Angeles v. Hughes, supra, at p.
736; Estate of Ross, supra, at pp. 65-66; HibeNilia Sa",; etc.
Soc. v. Ellis Estate Co., supra, at p. 411; City of Los Angeles
v. Deacon, supra); in another, the court was concerned with
the question of whether there was competent evidence of the
substantive inquiry as to value (MerchfJntsTrust Co. v.
Hopkins, supra, at pp. 478-479). Dickey v. Dunn, 80 Cal.App.
724, 728 [252 P. 770], and Thompson v. Stoakes, 46 Cal.App.
2d 285, 292-293 [115 P.2d 830], concerned evidence of sale of
the identical property in question, but in Bagdasarian v.
Gragnon, 31 Cal.2d 744, 758 [192 P.2d 935], the Thompson
case was expressly overruled on that point.
In Reclam4tion DiBt. No. 790 v. Inglin, supr..a, it does not
appear whether the redirect examination was properly limited
to the specific sales brought out upon cross-examination. In
any event, apparently it was argued on the appeal that such
evidence was admissible for the purpose of fixing the value
of the land in dispute, and was not correctly tendered for
the sole purpose of explaining the factors surrounding the
sales which tended to diminish the weight to be accorded
the witness' opinion. In Palladine v. Imperial Valley F. L.
Assn., 65 Cal.App. 727, 756 [225 P. 291], the testimony was
elicited upon cross-examination and the question presented
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was th~ propriety of refusing an instl'uction limiting the evidence to the purpose of testing the witnesses' knowledge
and discrediting their opinions.
The single case apparently standing for the rule asserted
by the state is Atchison, T. 4: S. F. R. 00. v. Southern Pac.
Co., 13 Cal.App.2d 505 [57 P.2d 575]. In that decision the
trial judge permitted an expert witness to testify upon redirect examination concerning the significant features of the
sales of other properties which had been mentioned during
the course of the cross-examination. In addition, the court
had allowed "[ q] uestions as to whether or not property
in the general locality of the property sought to be condemned
had increased in value. . .. This class of questions included
all property in the general locality in the case of some of the
questions, and in the case of other questions involved only
particular pieces of property in the locality." (P.511.) As
to the questions which were outside the scope of the crossexamination, it was properly held that the evidence was
inadmissible. And upon the assumption that the field of inquiry was the same as upon direct examination, the court
included as inadmissible the testimony as to specific sales
which was given upon cross-examination. For these reasons
the decision does not support the state's contention.
Complaint is also made of the admission of certain evidence relating to the purposes motivating the owners to purchase their properties, and to plant certain crops. Such
testimony, it is said, violates the principle that the true and
only criterion of damages is market value, and not the value
in use to the owner, either actual or prospective.
Upon cross-examination of Challen, he volunteered information that one of the owners "planted diversified fruit for the
purpose of selling . . . retailing right from his property
there. " A motion to strike was denied. Over objection
that it was "incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial," owner
Ernest Filice was permitted to testify upon direct examination
that "the sole purpose" in purchasing the property was
the location of the property on United States Highway 10l.
Over the same objection he also was permitted to state that
the main reason he purchased the property was ., on account
of that frontage in front and with the good visibility we
had in mind at some future date to take advantage of the
uses, commercial uses . . . to erect some kind of a business
on that frontage, whether either a gas station or a restaurant
or fruit stand.' I Ercole Pelliccione, coowner of another par-
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eel, over objection, was allowed to state his intention to build
a motel on his property, and that he planted two acres of
cherries in order to sell them at retail to travelers on the
highway.
[a1] This court "has definitely aligned itself with the
great majority of the courts in holding that damages must
be measured by the market value of the land at the time
it is taken, that the test is not the value for a special plirpose,
but the fair market value of the land in view of all the
purposes to which it is naturally adapted; that therefore
while evidence that it is 'valuable' for this or that or another
purpose may always be given and should be freely received,
the value in terms of money, the price, which one or another
witness may think the land would bring for this or that or
the other specific purpose is not admissible as an element in
determining that market value." (Sacramento etc. R. R.
Co. v. He11bron, 156 Cal. 408, 412 [104 P. 979].) [aa] "In
ascertaining the market value of real property any evidence
which tends to show the physical condition of the property,
the purpose for which it is employed, or any reasonable use
for which it may be adapted, is competent." (City of Los
Angeles v. Cole, 28 Cal.2d 509, 518 [170 P.2d 928], quoting
with approval from City of Beverly Hills v. Anger, 127 Cal.
App. 223, 228 [15 P.2d 867].)
[23] But evidence as to what the owner intended to do
with the land cannot be considered. (People v. Marblehead
Land Co., 82 Ca1.App. 289, 301 [255 P. 553-]; Los Angeles
v. Kerckhoff-Cuzner Mill. & Lbr. Co., 15 Cal.App. 676, 677
[115 P. 654].) For there can be no allowance for enhanced
camage which an owner "would suffer by reason of being
prevented from carrying out a particlilar scheme of improvement, existing only in contemplation at the time of the trial."
(Los Angeles v. Kerckhof/-Cuzner MilZ. cf Lbr. Co., ""pra,
at p. 688.) [a4] However, under certain circumstances,
evidence that a proposed use wolild result in a profit is admissible, "not for the purpose of enhancing the damages by
showing the loss to the owner of a particular plan of operation, but to show that such proposed plan is a feasible plan
and should be considered in :fixing market value." (City of
Daly City v. Smith, 110 Cal.App.2d 524, 532 [243 P.2d 46] ;
and see United States v. 25.406 Acres of Land, supra, at
p.994.)
Here, a portion of the testimony complained of was admitted in the course of a line of questioning indicating that
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it was offered as a description of the uses to which the prop·
erties were adaptable. But the majority of it comes squarely
within the rule which prohibits the admission of evidence
concerning an owner's purposes with regard to his property.
[25] However, to a considerable extent, any prejudice resulting from the erroneous admission of the evidence was
offset by other testimony similar in character which was received without objection. (See Mullanix v.Basich. 67 Cal.
App.2d 675. 679 [155 P.2d 130].) For example. Challen testified :"1 happen to know that the owner [of parcel 4] has put
in a very diversified orchard in there, in order to sell his commodities on the highway, which proves the fact that that
property does have commercial value; and . . . [the other
landowners] . . . bought their property [for the same
reason]."
[26] In this connection, the jury was instructed: "Whatever the purpose the Defendants had in connection with the
future use' of the property. can add nothing to its market
value. The fact that this purpose is defeated by condemnation. however much a disappointment. is not a matter of
compensation, A use existing or contemplated on property
is distinct from the market value of the property itself and
ill not the conclusive basis for fixing such market value,
and is not to be considered as determining the value of the
land. Value in use. is not to be considered by you as determining the market value of the property. A plan which
Defendants mayor may not have had for the improvement
of the property adds nothing to the market value. The fact
that a plan for the improvement. if any. was affected by
condemnation. however much a disappointment. is not a matter of compensation." It must be assumed that the jury
understood such clear and unambiguous language and correctly applied the instructions to the evidence. (Nunneley
v. Edgar Hotel. 36 Cal.2d 493. 500 [225 P.2d 497] ; Henderson
v. Los Angeles Traction 00., 150 Cal. 689. 697 [89 P. 976].)
[27] Next. t.he state attacks the instructions concerning
the existing right of access to the highway in which the iilry
was told that the owner of abuttin/r land has a private right
in such highway distinct from that of the public for the purpose of access to and egress from his land. This right. the
instruction stated, cannot be taken from the landowner without just compensation. The state complains of the trial judge's
failure to add that the right of a~cess is limited to that which
is reasonable for the purposes to which the property is
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adapted. Instead, it is argued, the instruction informs the jury
that the right of access is an unqualified and unlimited one
and not subordinate to normal highway uses.
On this subject the state requested and the court refused
an instruction stating that an abutting owner has no right to
insist upon the construction of a road in such a manner that
he may travel directly from the highway to any portion of
his adjoining land. The jurors might well have been told
that" [t]he extent of the easement of access may be said
to be that which is reasonably required giving consideration
to all the purposes to which the property is adapted" (Bacieh
v. Board of Oontrol, 23 Ca1.2d 343, 352 [144 P.2d 818]).
But they were instructed that only when the condemnation
destroys or substantially impairs the right of access is an
owner entitled to compensation therefor. Considering the
instructions as a whole, they fairly state the controlling
principles.
[28] The state also complains of the charge to the jury in
which it was said: "Owners are presumed to know the value of
their property, and being permitted under the law to testify
thereto, their evidence in that regard is et1titled to be weighed
and considered by the jury." This instruction, as read by
the state, informs the jury that the testimony of an owner
is entitled to greater weight than that of other witnesses
on value. Although the word "presumed" should not have
been used, it is significant that the awards are far below the
value placed by the owners upon their respective properties.
Moreover, the record shows instructions which state that the
final responsibility for determining the amounts to be awarded
rests with the jurors, and it is their duty to evaluate and
weigh the testimony of witnesses who stated their opinions
as to values.
Next, the state maintains that it was error to instruct the
jury "if possible, to reconcile the conflicting testimony and
to give it all due weight." The state argues that in view of
the wide discrepancy in the estimates of vahie and damage by
witnesses for the respective sides, it is clear that the opinions
were irreconcilably conflicting, and the effect of the instruction
was to tell the jury to "cut somewhere in between" divergent
amounts. [29] However, "Upon the trier of fact rests the
responsibility to reconcile, if possible, any apparent conflict,
whether the same arises upon the entire case or in the testimony of a single witness, and to effectuate all the evidence,
when the nature of the case will admit of such a disposition."
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(Darling v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 197 Cal. 702, 708 [242 P.
703] ; Boens v. Bennett, 20 Cal.App.2d 477, 483 [67 P.2d 715].)
Finally, the state contends, the jury was erroneously advised that, in ascertaining market value, the purpose for
which the property was being taken by the state could be
considered. [30] Compensation is based on loss imposed
on the owner, rather than on benefit received by the taker.
(Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195
[30 S.Ct. 459, 54 L.Ed. 725]; Orgel on Valuation Under
Eminent Domain, § 79, p. 257.) The beneficial purpose to
be derived by the condemnor's use of the property is not to
be taken into consideration in determining market values,
for it is wholy irrelevant. (City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.
App. 369, 400 [244 P. 609].) [31] But the jury in the
present case also was told: "Although the market value of the
property is to be determined with due consideration of all its
available uses, its special value to the State as distinguished
from others who mayor may not possess the power to condemn, must be excluded as an element of market value."
In view of that concise statement of the law, the erroneous
language in the other instruction could not have influenced
the awards. Furthermore, and most significant, there is no
evidence in regard to the value of the use to the state for
highway purposes, and the jury received the usual instruction
to award compensation "in accordance with the evidence in
this case."
Although some of the rulings and instructions were erroneous, it cannot reasonably be said that, upon examination of
the entire record, there has been a miscarriage of justice
requiring reversal of the judgment. (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 41h.)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-l concur in
the judgment. Nevertheless I must protest the obsolescent
rule, reaffirmed by the majority, that the value of real property cannot be proved by evidence of sales of comparable rea]
pr~perty.
Only a few courts follow it, and their number
diminishes. The most recent to abandon the rule are the
Court of Appeals of New York and the Supreme Court of
Nebraska. (Village of Lawrence v. Greenwood, 300 N.Y. 231
[90 N.E.2d 53, 56J; Langdon v. lhup River Public Power
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Did., 142 Neb. 859 [8 N.W.2d 201, 206].) It has withered
under the devast8(ting attacks on it. (See Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed.], § 463, p. 503 et seq.; 174 A.L.R. 386; 118
A.L.R. 870; 32 C.J.S., Evidence, p. 444 et seq.; City of Los
Angeles v. Cole, 28 Ca1.2d 509, 517 [170 P.2d 928] [dissent];
Heimann v. City of Los Angeles, 30 Ca1.2d 746, 760 [185
P.2d 597] [dissent].) Why bolster it when it is doomed T
Admittedly such evidence, which everyone uses to determine value, is relevant; so relevant that it is hardly credible
that it would be excluded. It is conceded that on cross-examination a witness may be questioned as to his knowledge of
sales of comparable property. (City of Los Angeles v. Cole,
supra, 28 Ca1.2d 509, 518.) On redirect examination he may
be questioned regarding such sales in relation to the ,aluation
that he gave on direct examination. (See majority opinion
herein disapproving Atchison, T. ~ S. F. R. Co. v. Souther'll
Pac. Co., 13 Cal.App.2d 505 [57 P.2d 575].) Why is there
no concern about collateral issues on cross or redirect examination and concern of phantom proportions on direct examination 7 The magnified risk of collateral issues must be balanced against the reality of inevitable confusion when jurors
hear evidence of the greatest relevance and are then told
that they cannot base the value of the property on that evidence.
The trial court has ample power to keep the trial under
control. As the New York Court of Appeals noted in its
opinion overruling earlier cases, "Instances .there may be
where proof of sales of comparable property may prompt a
line of inquiry which will develop collateral issues likely to
confuse the fact-finders and prolong the trial. We regard
such disadvantages, however, as more than compensated by
the benefit to be gained by the receipt of such evidence subject
to the exercise, by the tribunal which fixes value, of its discretionary power to draw the line of exclusion wherever confusion is caused by collateral issues." (ViUage of Lawrence
v. Greenwood, supra, 90 N.E.2d 53, 56.)
In the present case the owner testified, not to an actual sale
of comparable real property, but to an unaccepted offer to
buy the property in question. Most courts that admit evidence
of sales of comparable property hold that evidence of an
unaccepted offer is not of sufficient probative value to justify
admission. (See 7 A.L.R.2d 781.) Other courts, however,
admit such evidence, if the offer is shown to be bona fide and
a sufficient foundation is laid. (Chicago v. Lehmann, 262
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Ill. 468, 474 [104 N.E. 829]; Tharp v. Massengl1l, 38 N.M.
58,62 [28 P.2d 502, 94 A.L.R. 726] ; see Union Nat. Bank v.
Crump, 349 Pa. 339, 343 (37 A.2d 733].) It is my opinion
that when, as here, the offer is bona fide and is for the identical
property, and is by a purchaser able and willing to buy, evidence of the offer should be admitted. Accordingly, the trial
judge ruled correctly that the witness could mention the offer
for his property in giving the reasons for his valuation. (See
Long Beach City H.S. Dist. v. Stewart, 30 Cal.2d 763, 773
[185 P.2d 585,173 A.L.R. 249].)
Carter, J., and Schauer, concurred.
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